More Filters. A software vulnerabilities are defects in the code that could be exploited. Security expert McGraw separates these into two categories: bugs, and flaws [1,2]. Bugs are implementation problems in … Expand. View 3 excerpts, cites background and methods. Computer Science, Engineering. Highly Influenced. View 6 excerpts, cites background. Software security. Addressing software application security issues.
Software tend to be omnipresent in all modern systems. It often manipulates critical resources which interests pirates and need to be secured.
Given the fact that most common software attacks can't … Expand. View 2 excerpts, cites background. Software Code Protection through Software Obfuscation. View 1 excerpt, cites methods. Matching attack patterns to security vulnerabilities in software-intensive system designs. View 2 excerpts, cites background and methods. Analysing Malicious Code: : Dynamic Techniques. Securing Java: getting down to business with mobile code. Software vulnerability analysis.
From the Book: My experience in securing systems is that most users are shocked when they find out how vulnerable they really are. Perhaps this book will shock you. No matter what, it will educate … Expand. How to Break Software Security. San Antonio, TX: January. Software Complexity: Measures and Methods Programming.
Complex Systems,. Related Papers. Anyone who has ever programmed knows that there are unlimited numbers of choices when writing code. An important choice is which programming language to use. Do you want something that allows the flexibility of pointer arithmetic with the opportunities it allows for manual performance optimization, or do you want a type-safe language that avoids buffer overflows but removes some of your power? For every task, there are seemingly infinite choices of algorithms, parameters, and data structures to use.
For every block of code, there are choices on how to name variables, how to comment, and even how to lay out the code in relation to the white space around it.
Every programmer is. Large software projects are written in teams, and different programmers have to be able to understand and modify the code written by others. It is hard enough to manage one's own code, let alone software produced by someone else. Avoiding serious security vulnerabilities in the resulting code is challenging for programs with hundreds of lines of code.
For programs with millions of lines of code, such as modern operating systems, it is impossible. However, large systems must be built, so we cannot just give up and say that writing such systems securely is impossible.
McGraw and Hoglund have done a marvelous job of. You might wonder whether it is a good idea to demonstrate how exploits work, as this book does. In fact, there is a trade off that security professionals must consider, between publicizing exploits and keeping them quiet. This book takes the correct position that the only way to program in such a way that minimizes the vulnerabilities in software is to understand why vulnerabilities exist and how attackers exploit them.
To this end, this book is a must-read for anybody building any networked application or operating system. Java runtime environment and the security issues surrounding the novel concept of untrusted mobile code running inside a trusted browser. McGraw's later book, Building Secure Software , was a classic, demonstrating concepts that could be used to avoid many of the vulnerabilities described in the current book.
Hoglund has vast experience developing rootkits and. After reading this book, you may find it surprising not that so many deployed systems can be hacked, but that so many systems have not yet been hacked. The analysis we did of an electronic voting machine demonstrated that software vulnerabilities are all around us.
The fact that many systems have not yet been exploited only means that attackers are satisfied with lower hanging fruit right now. This will be of little comfort to me the next time I go to the polls and am faced with a Windows-based electronic voting machine. Maybe I'll just mail in an absentee ballot, at least that voting technology's insecurities are not based on software flaws.
Software security is gaining momentum as security professionals realize that computer security is really all about making software behave. The publication of Building Secure Software in Viega and McGraw unleashed a number of related books that have crystallized software security as a critical field. Already, security professionals, software developers, and business leaders are resonating with the message and asking for more.
Building Secure Software co-authored by McGraw is intended for software professionals ranging from developers to managers, and is aimed at helping people develop more secure code. Exploiting Software is useful to the same target audience, but is really intended for security professionals interested in how to find new flaws in software.
This book should be of particular interest to security practitioners working to beef up their software security skills, including red teams and ethical hackers. Exploiting Software is about how to break code. Our intention is to provide a realistic view of the technical issues faced by security professionals.
This book is aimed directly toward. As security professionals come to grips with the software security problem, they need to understand how software systems break. Solutions to each of the problems discussed in Exploiting Software can be found in Building Secure Software. The two books are mirror images of each other. This book closely examines many real-world software exploits, explaining how and why they work, the attack patterns they are based on, and in some cases how they were discovered.
Along the way, this book also shows how to uncover new software vulnerabilities and how to use them to break machines. Chapter 1 describes why software is the root of the computer security problem. We introduce the trinity of trouble —complexity, extensibility, and connectivity—and describe why the software security problem is growing. We also describe the future of software and its implications for software exploit. Chapter 2 describes the difference between implementation bugs and architectural flaws.
We discuss the problem of securing an open system, and explain why risk management is the only sane approach. Two real-world exploits are introduced: one very simple and one technically complex. At the heart of Chapter 2 is a description of attack patterns. We show how attack patterns fit into the classic network security paradigm and describe the role that attack patterns play in the rest of the book. The subject of Chapter 3 is reverse engineering.
Attackers disassemble, decompile, and deconstruct programs to understand how they work and how they can be made not to. Chapter 3 describes common gray box analysis techniques, including the idea of using a security patch as an attack map.
We discuss Interactive Disassembler IDA , the state-of-the-art tool used by hackers to understand programs. We also discuss in detail how real cracking tools are built and used. In Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7, we discuss particular attack examples that provide instances of attack patterns. These examples are marked with an asterisk. Chapters 4 and 5 cover the two ends of the client—server model.
Chapter 4 begins where the book Hacking Exposed [McClure et al. Chapter 5 is about attacking client software using in-band signals, cross-site scripting, and mobile code. The problem of backwash attacks is also introduced. Chapter 6 is about crafting malicious input.
It goes far beyond standard-issue "fuzzing" to discuss partition analysis, tracing code, and reversing parser code. Special attention is paid to crafting equivalent requests using alternate encoding techniques. Once again, both real-world example exploits and the attack patterns that inspire them are highlighted throughout. The whipping boy of software security, the dreaded buffer overflow, is the subject of Chapter 7. This chapter is a highly technical treatment of buffer overflow attacks that leverages the fact that other texts supply the basics.
We discuss buffer overflows in embedded systems, database buffer overflows, buffer overflow as targeted against Java, and content-based buffer overflows. Chapter 7 also describes how to find potential buffer overflows of all kinds,.
Advanced techniques such as active armor and the use of trampolines to defeat weak security mechanisms are also covered. Chapter 7 includes a large number of attack patterns. Chapter 8 is about rootkits—the ultimate apex of software exploit.
This is what it means for a machine to be "owned. We cover call hooking, executable redirection, hiding files and processes, network support, and patching binary code. A number of advanced rootkit topics top off Chapter 8. This book is useful to many different kinds of people: network administrators, security consultants, information warriors, developers, and security programmers.
If you are responsible for a network full of running software, you should read this book to learn the kinds of weaknesses that exist in your system and how they are likely to manifest. If you are a security consultant, you should read this book so you can effectively locate, understand, and measure security holes in customer systems.
If you are involved in offensive information warfare, you should use this book to learn how to penetrate enemy systems through software. Today, all developers should be security minded. The knowledge here will arm you with a real understanding of the software security problem.
It's important to emphasize that none of the information we discuss here is news to the hacker community. Some of these techniques are as old as the hills.
Our real objective is to provide some eye-opening information and up the level of discourse in software security. Some security experts may worry that revealing the techniques described in this book will encourage more people to try them out. Perhaps this is true, but hackers have always had better lines of communication and information sharing than the good guys.
This information needs to be understood and digested by security professionals so that they know the magnitude of the problem and they can begin to address it properly.
Shall we grab the bull by the horns or put our head in the sand? This book took a long time to write. Many people helped, both directly and indirectly. We retain the blame for any errors and omissions herein, but we want to share the credit with those who have directly influenced our work. First and foremost I acknowledge my business partner and now wife, Penny. This work would not have been possible without her support. Big thanks to my daughter Kelsey too! Along the way, many people have offered their time and technical know-how.
A big thanks to Matt Hargett for coming up with a killer idea and having the historical perspective needed for success. Also, thanks to Shawn Bracken and Jon Gary for sitting it out in my garage and using an old door for a desk. Thanks to David Aitel and other members of 0dd for providing technical feedback on shell code techniques.
The creative environment and top-notch people make going to work every day a pleasure even with the economy in the doldrums. The self-starting engineering team including the likes of Frank Charron, Todd McAnally, and Mike Debnam builds great stuff and puts ideas into concrete practice. The SSG continues to expand the limits of world-class software security.
Thanks to Pat Higgins and Mike Firetti for keeping me busy tap dancing. Also thanks to Cigital's esteemed Technical Advisory Board. Finally, a special thanks to Yvonne Wiley, who keeps track of my location on the planet quite adeptly.
Without my co-author, Greg Hoglund, this book would never have happened. Greg's intense skills can be seen throughout this work. If you dig the technical meat in this book, thank Greg. Like my previous three books, this book is really a collaborative effort.
So you want to break software, leave it begging for mercy in RAM after it has relinquished all of its secrets and conjured up a shell for you. Hacking the machine is almost always about exploiting software. And more often than not, the machine is not even a standard. This book shows you how software breaks and teaches you how to exploit software weakness in order to control the machine. There are plenty of good books on network security out there. Bruce Schneier's Secrets and Lies [] provides a compelling nickel tour of the facilities, filled to the brim with excellent examples and wise insight.
Hacking Exposed , by McClure et al. Defending against such attacks is important, but is only one step in the right direction. Getting past the level of script kiddie tools is essential to better defense and offense. The W hitehat Security Arsenal [Rubin, ] can help you defend a network against any number of security problems. Ross Anderson's Security Engineering [] takes a detailed systematic look at the problem. So why another book on security?
As Schneier says in the Preface to Building Secure Software [Viega and McGraw, ], "We wouldn't have to spend so much time, money, and effort on network security if we didn't have such bad software security. Think about the most recent security vulnerability you've read about.
Maybe it's a killer packet, which allows an attacker to crash some server by sending it a particular packet. Maybe it's one of the gazillions of buffer overflows, which allow an attacker to take control of a computer by sending it a particular malformed message.
Maybe it's an encryption vulnerability, which allows an attacker to read an encrypted message, or fool an authentication system. These are all software issues. Today, users are more likely to wear computers than to enter them. Of all the technology drivers that have brought about this massive change, including the vacuum tube, the transistor, and the silicon chip, the most important by far is software. Software is what sets computers apart from other technological innovations.
The very idea of reconfiguring a machine to do a seemingly infinite number of tasks is powerful and. The concept has a longer history as an idea than it has as a tangible enterprise. In working through his conception of the Analytical Engine in , Charles Babbage enlisted the help of Lady Ada Lovelace as a translator.
Ada, who called herself "an Analyst and Metaphysician ," understood the plans for the device as well as Babbage, but was better at articulating its promise, especially in the notes that she appended to the original work.
She understood that the Analytical Engine was what we would call a general-purpose computer, and that it was suited for "developping [sic] and tabulating any function whatever According to Webster's Collegiate dictionary, the word software came into common use in In the s, the addition of "modern, high-level" languages like Fortran, Pascal, and C allowed software to begin to carry out more and more important operations.
Computers began to be defined more clearly by what software they ran than by what hardware the programs operated on. Operating systems sprouted and evolved. Early networks were formed and grew. A great part of this evolution and growth happened in software. The fact that hardware today is. A funny thing happened on the way to the Internet. Software, once thought of solely as a beneficial enabler, turned out to be agnostic when it came to morals and ethics. As it turns out, Lady Lovelace's claim that software can provide "any function whatsoever" is true, and that "any function" includes malicious functions, potentially dangerous functions, and just plain wrong functions.
As software became more powerful, it began moving out of strictly technical realms the domain of the geeks and into many other areas of life.
Business and military use of software became increasingly common. It remains very common today. This means that software failure leads to serious problems. In fact, software that fails or misbehaves can now. Networks have had a very large mostly negative impact on the idea of making software behave.
Since its birth in the early s as a node network called the ARPANET, the Internet has been adopted at an unprecedented rate, moving into our lives much more speedily than a number of other popular technologies, including electricity and the telephone Figure If the Internet is a car, software is its engine.
Figure Rate of adoption of various technologies in years. The slopes of the different curves are telling. Clearly, the. Internet is being adopted more quickly and thus with a more profound cultural impact than any other human technology in history. Information from Dan Geer, personal communication.
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